Death Penalty Jurisprudence in New York and the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution:
How Supreme is it ?
By
Joseph E. Fahey1
In 1995, after a two decade hiatus, New York State returned to the fold of states that
sanction capital punishment. During the next nine years the state’s highest court, the Court of
Appeals, would both invalidate and interpret various provisions of the 1995 legislation drawing
on its own historical capital punishment jurisprudence, as well as that of the United States
Supreme Court. In these decisions, it would faithfully bow to the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution2 for the underpinnings of its determinations. This article will examine
those decisions and the accuracy of those pronouncements up through its holding in People v.
Lavalle3 which brought an end to capital punishment in New York.
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History of the Supremacy Clause in New York Decisions
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia,4 abolished capital
punishment in the United States after determining that it violated the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment.”5 The following year, the New York Court of
Appeals adhering to the decision in Furman abolished the death penalty in New York.6 In
Fitzpatrick.7 Chief Justice Fuld, after discussing the holding in Furman, wrote;
“Since, then, the New York statute here challenged Penal Law section 125.35(5)
leaves infliction, of the death penalty solely to the discretion of the jury, we
conclude, in light of the Supreme Court's reading of the Eighth Amendment in
Furman (408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed. 2d 346 Supra), that we have no
alternative but to hold that that penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
within the sense of that provision. The circumstance that the penalty is limited to
those found guilty of killing police and other peace officers is irrelevant; it does
not alter or affect the fact that the Legislature, instead of providing mandatory
death sentences for all defendants who kill police officers, has vested juries with a
discretion to decide, case by case, whether that ultimate punishment should be
inflicted.”(id., at 512-3)
In the wake of Furman a number of states re-enacted capital punishment statutes
including New York, which made it mandatory in all Murder in the First Degree prosecutions.8
In 1976 the Supreme Court held that although capital punishment was not per se
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unconstitutional, the mandatory schemes, like New York were, in fact, unconstitutional.9 The
following year in People v. Davis10 the Court again struck down the death penalty recognizing
that it contained the same infirmities identified by the Supreme Court in Roberts v. Louisiana.11
Once again, the Court relied on the Supremacy Clause. Judge Cooke, writing for the majority,
observed;
“We approach our consideration of this issue with full recognition that the State
statutes under scrutiny carry with them a strong presumption of constitutionality,
that they will be stricken as unconstitutional only as a last resort and that courts
may not substitute their judgment for that of the Legislature as to the wisdom and
expediency of the legislation. As stated by Justice Blackmun in his dissent in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 411, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2815, 33 L.Ed 2d 346,
“We should not allow our personal preferences as to the wisdom of legislative * *
* action, or our distaste for such action, to guide our judicial decision in cases
such as these. The temptations to cross that policy line are very great”. At the
same time, it must be kept firmly in mind that this court, as other State courts, is
bound by rulings of the United States Supreme Court as to the validity of State
statutes under the United States Constitution ( Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt,
320 U.S. 430, 438, 64 S. Ct. 208, 88 L.Ed. 2d 149; Bourjois Sales Corp. v.
Dorfman, 273 N.Y. 167, 171, 7 N.E. 2d 30, 31).”(supra., at 31).
More specifically addressing the holding in Roberts and its application to the case at bar, he
wrote;
“Any doubt concerning the question of constitutionality, however, has now been
removed and has been firmly resolved by the Supreme Court in Roberts (Harry) v.
Louisiana (431 U.S. 633. It is decisive.”(ibid., at 32)
Seven years later, the Court was again called upon to review a death sentence that had
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been imposed on a defendant convicted of Murder in the First Degree12. This case involved the
killing ofa prison guard, while the defendant was serving a life sentence for murder.13 During her
discussion of the prior case law on this issue, Judge Kaye noted that this particular subdivision of
the death penalty statute was unsettled;
“But the issue on this appeal cannot be so readily resolved. The Supreme Court
has repeatedly, without explication, stated that it was not deciding whether the
Eighth Amendment forbids a mandatory death penalty for murder committed by a
person serving a life term of imprisonment Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
n.11, 98 S.Ct 2954, 2964, n.11 57 L. Ed 2d 973, supra; Roberts [Harry] v.
Louisiana 431 U.S.633, 637, n.5 97 S.Ct. 1993, supra; Roberts [Stanislaus] v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S.325, 344 n.9 96 S.Ct. 3001, 3006 n.9 49 L. Ed. 2d 974, supra;
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 287 n.7, 292, n.25, 96 S. Ct. 2978,
2983, n.7, 2985 n. 2549 . Ed. 2d 944, supra; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
186, 96 S. Ct.29099, 2931, 49 L.Ed. 2d 859 supra ). This court also has expressly
left the question open People v. Davis, 43 N.Y. 2d, at p.34, n.3, 400 N.Y. S. 2d
735, 371 N.E. 2d 456).”63 N.Y. 2d 41, 75)
After reviewing the foregoing cases and the Supreme Court’s more recent decisions,14 she went
on to hold the statute unconstitutional expressly relying on the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and expressly declining to consider Article 1, section 5 the New York State
Constitution, writing;
“In sum, New York's mandatory death penalty is constitutionally infirm as applied
to this defendant because of its failure to provide for the consideration of
individual circumstances, one of the three deficiencies of a mandatory death
penalty articulated in the plurality opinion in Woodson. In view of our conclusion
that New York's statute contravenes the Federal Constitution, we do not reach the
issue of the State Constitution's similar prohibition of cruel and unusual
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punishments( art 1, Section5), or defendant's additional arguments that a
mandatory death penalty for life-term inmates suffers from the other two
deficiencies of a mandatory death statute identified in Woodson.”( supra., at 78-9)
Thus, in 1984 it was clear beyond cavil that death penalty jurisprudence in New York was
governed by the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
The 1995 Statute
In 1995 New York’s capital punishment hiatus came to an end. The New York State
legislature passed a comprehensive capital punishment scheme designed to meet all possible
constitutional objections and infirmities.15 Included in the legislation were two provisions which
would generate considerable judicial discussion. The first was embodied in Sections
220.10(5)(e), 220.30(b)(vii), and 220.60(2)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Law, which only
allowed a defendant to avoid the death penalty by entering a plea of guilty with the consent of the
court and the prosecutor. The second was the “anticipatory deadlock” instruction set forth in
Criminal Procedure Law Section 400.27 (10).
Matter of Hynes v. Tomei16
Hynes v. Tomei originated in Supreme Court of Kings County as an outgrowth of People
v. Hale.17 In Hale the defendant was charged with Murder in the First Degree and challenged the
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constitutionality of Sections 220.10(5)(e), 220.30(b)(vii), and 220.60(2)(a) of the Criminal
Procedure Law. The defendant argued that those plea restrictions violated his Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury pursuant to the
Constitution of the United States. Justice Tomei in Hale supra, agreed relying upon United
States v. Jackson18 in which the United States Supreme Court struck down the death penalty
provision in the Federal Kidnaping Act19 which permitted the imposition of the death penalty
only after a jury trial. As Justice Tomei summarized the holding in Jackson, he noted;
“According to the Court, the statute needlessly encouraged guilty pleas and
effectively penalized the defendant to the risk of death only when he exercised his
constitutional rights.”20
Comparing the statute in Jackson to the New York scheme, he went on to observe;
“It is apparent that New York’s death penalty statute, likewise provides for the
imposition of the death penalty only upon recommendation of the jury; the
provisions governing pleas in capital cases in New York expressly forbid the
imposition of the death penalty upon a plea of guilty, and a defendant may not
waive a jury trial where the charged crime may be punishable by death. Only if the
defendant insists upon exercising his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and his
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination does he risk death. Therefore
unless New York’s law may be distinguished from the Act in question in Jackson
(supra) this court is bound to find the plea provisions to be unconstitutional.”21
Upon Justice Tomei’s finding that the questioned provisions were unconstitutional, the
prosecution sought Article 78 relief in the Appellate Division Second Department of New York

18

390 U.S. 570 (1968).

19

18 U.S.C. 1201(a).

20

173 Misc. 2d at 179.

21

Ibid.
6

State Supreme Court.22 That Court reversed Tomei’s decision and granted a writ of prohibition
against enforcement of the justice’s order.
During this same time period, a similar challenge arose in Relin v. O’Connell.23 In
response to Judge O’Connell’s decision to invalidate the same plea provisions in reliance on
Jackson, the Appellate Division Fourth Department likewise reversed the Judge’s decision and
granted a writ of prohibition against enforcement of the Judge’s order.
Both cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.
In a unanimous decision, reversing both Appellate Division decisions, the Court found
that the plea provisions did, indeed, run afoul of the United States Supreme Court holding in
Jackson.24 At the outset of her opinion, Chief Judge Kaye observed;.
“Despite the passage of three decades, a plethora of decisions involving the death
penalty and a sea change in plea bargaining, the Supreme Court has never
overruled Jackson, which binds this Court.”25
Thus, Judge Kaye was clearly bowing to the Supremacy Clause in declaring that Jackson
controlled the result.
After discussing the applicability of Jackson to the plea provisions in question, as well as
the importance of plea bargaining to the judicial system, she acknowledged that the result
reached by the Court would reduce the flexibility in plea bargaining. She went on to note that,
although the Court was invalidating these provisions of the capital punishment scheme, the
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severability provision in the legislation would allow the remainder of it to survive. Nonetheless,
she closed the Court’s opinion with a further reaffirmation of the binding nature of the
Supremacy Clause, writing;
“we are also aware that the Supreme Court has not revisited Jackson and its
progeny in 20 years, and that these cases might be decided differently today in
light of the increased significance of plea bargaining and substantial changes in
the administration of capital punishment. The fact remains, however, that
although the Supreme Court itself may revisit its interpretation of federal
constitutional provisions, State Courts are bound under the federal Constitution to
follow the controlling Supreme Court precedent, and Jackson compels the result
here.”26
While the Court would interpret the provisions of New York’s capital punishment
scheme27 and decide two death penalty cases28 that came to it in the ensuing years, it would not
invoke the provisions of the New York State Constitution and detour from the Supremacy Clause
until it invalidated the “anticipatory” deadlock instruction provided for in Section 400.27(10) of
the Criminal Procedure Law29.
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Section 400.27 (10) of the Criminal Procedure Law reads in pertinent part; “At the
conclusion of all the evidence...the court shall deliver a charge to the jury...In its charge, the court
must instruct the jury that with respect to each count of murder in the first degree the jury should
consider whether or not a sentence of death should be imposed and whether a sentence of life
imprisonment without parole should be imposed, and that the jury must be unanimous with
respect to either sentence. The court must also instruct the jury that in the event the jury fails to
reach a unanimous agreement with respect to the sentence, the court will sentence the defendant
8

People v. Lavalle30
The Lavalle case came directly to the Court of Appeals after the defendant was convicted
of Murder in the First Degree in violation of Section 125.27(1)(a)(vii) of the Penal Law in
Supreme Court, Suffolk County and was sentenced to death. Among the issues raised on appeal
was the constitutionality of Section 400.27(10) of the Criminal Procedure Law, the “anticipatory”
deadlock instruction. Challenges to this instruction had been raised and disposed of in different
ways by a variety of different courts.31 The only court to find it unconstitutional was the trial
court in People v. Harris.32 In Lavalle, Justice George Bundy Smith, writing for the majority,
observed;
“...New York’s deadlock provision is unique in that the sentence required after a
deadlock is less severe than the sentences the jury is allowed to consider. No other
death penalty scheme in the country requires judges to instruct jurors that if they
cannot unanimously agree between two choices the judge will sentence the
defendant to a third more lenient choice.”(3 N.Y. 3d 88, 116-7)
He next went on to describe the danger, he believed, that was inherent in the instruction,
“The deadlock instruction interjects the fear that if jurors do not reach unanimity,
the defendant may be paroled in 20 years and pose a threat to society in the future.
Yet, in New York a defendant’s future dangerousness is not a statutory aggravator
the jury may consider.
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By interjecting future dangerousness, the deadlock instruction gives rise to an
unconstitutionally palpable risk that one or more jurors who cannot bear the
thought that a defendant again after serving 20 or 25 years will join jurors
favoring death in order to avoid the deadlock sentence....For jurors who are
inclined toward life without parole, the choice is between death and life without
parole, a Hobson’s choice in light of the juror’s likely concerns over defendant’s
future dangerousness. The choice of death results not through ‘ a comparison of
views, and arguments among the jurors themselves,’ but through fear and coercion
(Jones v. United States, 527 US 373, 382 [1999], quoting Allen v. United States,
164 US 492, 501 [1986]). New York’s statute is unique in its coercive effect.”( 3
N.Y. 3d 88 at 118-119)

Certainly one could argue that a juror confronted with this dilemma might be equally moved
to change their vote from death to life imprisonment without parole in order to avoid the result
posited by Judge Bundy Smith above, although the speculative nature of this conjecture does not
necessarily eliminate the possibility that a death verdict might not, in certain cases, be coerced.33
Of particular interest is the reference to Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373 (1999) as
authority for the Court to invalidate the instruction under the provisions of the State Constitution,
given the Court’s historical fealty to the Supremacy Clause. In Jones supra the Supreme Court
quite clearly declared that there was no constitutional right to a deadlock instruction. As Justice
Thomas declared in that case;
“Nevertheless, the Eighth Amendment does not require that the jurors be
instructed as to the consequences of their failure to agree.”(527 U.S. 373, 381)
Additionally the Court went to hold that it would not use its supervisory powers to require one.34
The Court not only deviated from its long-held deference to the Supremacy Clause in
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deciding this issue but had harsh criticism for the holding in Jones. Discussing its merits, Judge
Bundy Smith observed;
“In this case, we regard Jones v. United States (527 U.S.373 [1999]) as unfaithful
to the often repeated principle that death is qualitatively different and thus subject
to a heightened standard of reliability (see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 US 153 [1976];
Woodson, supra; Beck, supra).”(ibid., at 127)
The Court not only went on to invalidate the instruction under the Due Process Clause of
the State Constitution35 but additionally held that, unlike the holding in Jones, our State
Constitution would require some type of deadlock instruction before capital prosecutions could
be resumed. Addressing this issue the Judge declared;
“We further conclude that the absence of any instruction is no better than the
current instruction under our constitutional analysis, and thus we decline to adopt
Jones. Like the flawed deadlock instruction, the absence of an instruction would
lead to death sentences that are based on speculation as the Legislature apparently
feared when it decided to prescribe the instruction. As the studies previously cited
indicate, jurors might fear that the failure to reach a unanimous verdict would lead
to a defendant’s release, retrial or sentence to an even lesser term than the one
currently prescribed in the deadlock scenario.”(id., at 128).
Amplifying this point, Judge Bundy Smith wrote;
“As noted, the Jones court held that ‘ the Eighth Amendment [to the Federal
Constitution] does not require that the jurors be instructed as to the consequence
of their failure to agree’ (527 US at 381). It bears reiterating here that ‘on
innumerable occasions this [C]ourt has given [the] State Constitution an
independent construction, affording the rights and liberties of the citizens of this
State even more protections than may be secured under the United States
Constitution’ (Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45 N.Y. 2d at 159). We hold that
in this case the Due Process Clause of the New York Constitution requires a
higher standard of fairness than the Federal Constitution as interpreted by the
Jones majority (see N.Y. Const. Art. I, section 6[‘No person shall be deprived of
life liberty or property without due process of law’]”(infra., at 129)
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He went on to further observe;
“Now recognizing the gravity of capital punishment and the concomitant need for
greater certainty in the outcome of capital jury sentences, we hold that providing
no deadlock instruction in th course of capital sentencing violates our Due Process
Clause. Our conclusion is buttressed by the clear legislative intent that there be a
jury instruction on the consequences of a deadlock.”(supra, at 130)
At first blush the remedy for this defect in the instruction appears simple. A jury need
only be instructed that if it could not unanimously agree on a verdict of death, the court would
sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without parole, thus making the non-capital
alternative the minimum sentence that could be imposed in a capital case upon the failure to
agree. Such an instruction could, in no way, be construed as coercing a verdict of death. Rather
than supply this remedy, however, the Court declined to take this corrective action. Instead, it
sent the problem back to the Legislature to take corrective action, commenting;
“We cannot, however, ourselves craft a new instruction, because to do so would
usurp legislative prerogative. We have the power to eliminate an unconstitutional
sentencing procedure, but we do not have the power to fill the void with a
different procedure, particularly one that potentially imposes a greater sentence
than the possible deadlock sentence that has been prescribed. As the Court noted
in People v. Gersewitz (294 NY 163, 169 [1945]) we have ‘no power to supply
even an inadvertent omission of the Legislature.’ We thus conclude that under the
present statute, the death penalty may not be imposed. Cases in which death
notices have been filed may go forward as noncapital first degree murder
prosecutions.”(3 N.Y. 3d, at 131)
Deference to legislative prerogative aside, it is impossible to see how the Legislature
could craft a deadlock instruction in which any other lesser sentence than life without parole
could be imposed without running afoul of the holding in Lavalle.36 Moreover, the Court’s
holding that the defect in the deadlock instruction is not severable, not only runs afoul of the

36
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language of the statute itself but counter to its holding in Hynes v. Tomei.37 As noted previously,
the Court had held in Hynes v. Tomei that, despite the invalidation of the plea bargaining
restriction, the remainder of the statutory scheme was saved.38 The application of the severability
clause in Hynes clearly commanded the result in People v. Harris.39
In Harris, the Court invalidated the defendant’s death sentence because he was
prosecuted at a time when the plea-bargaining restrictions invalidated in Hynes were in effect. In
doing so, however, Judge Wesley, apparently taking note of the severability provision, observed;
“The People and the Attorney General urge us to review Hynes and “modify” our
holding to restore the sections we declared unconstitutional. Neither offers a new
argument for a different result. Both acknowledge that if Hynes remains the law,
defendant's death sentence must be vacated. All seven of us have concluded that
there is no reason to retreat from Hynes all of us agree that the statute at the time
of defendant's trial impermissibly discouraged defendant's assertion of his Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the trial court could not
constitutionally impose the sentence of death on this defendant. The appropriate
remedy is to vacate his death sentence and to remit his case to Supreme Court
pursuant to CPL 470. 30(5)(c) for resentencing in accordance with Penal Law
Sections 60.06 and 70.05.”(supra., at 496)40
There is, of course, the issue of whether a deadlock instruction is either required or
needed at all. As noted above, the Supreme Court in Jones held that there is no constitutional
right to a deadlock instruction under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The majority in Lavalle has commanded that the New York State Constitution’s Due Process
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Clause requires one. Clearly, the risk of instructing a capital jury that a failure to reach a
unanimous verdict of death will result in a sentence of life imprisonment without parole puts into
the hands of a single hold-out juror the ability to determine that a non-capital sentence will be
imposed. Nonetheless, Judge R.S. Smith’s observation in his dissent, that;
“...the majority’s opinion seems to leave only one possible deadlock instruction
for the legislature to ‘craft’. Logically, the only instruction that can eliminate the
danger of the majority is concerned about - -a juror’s fear of the possibility of a
defendant’s release- -is one that tells the jury that no possibility exists. Thus, it
seems that the only deadlock instruction the majority would uphold is one that tell
the jury that a deadlock would result in life without parole- - and the majority is,
in effect, telling the Legislature that the death penalty cannot be enforced until
such an instruction is enacted.”41
has some validity.
The majority belief that absent a deadlock instruction a capital jury could speculate that a
defendant convicted of a capital offense might “...fear that the failure to reach a unanimous
verdict, would lead to a defendant’s release, retrial or sentence to an even lesser term than the
one currently prescribed in the deadlock scenario.”42 does seem a bit far-fetched, notwithstanding
the “studies previously cited”.43 It is hard to believe that a juror in this day and age, deliberating
on the question of whether a defendant’s life should be taken or spared in the penalty phase of a
capital trial would believe that the failure to agree on this issue would result in a defendant going
free, despite having been convicted of a capital offense. The decision not to instruct them on this
issue and leaving the trial court to sentence the defendant to life without parole versus instructing
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them that the defendant will be sentenced to life without parole, the only option the majority
appears to leave open, seems to be a negligible one.
At this writing, the Legislature has failed to craft a deadlock instruction and Murder in the
First Degree prosecutions are exclusively non-capital cases. The Court of Appeals in People v.
Shulman,44 its most recent capital appeal, reaffirmed this status. In the coming term the Court
may revisit the issue again in People v. Taylor.45 There, the trial judge denied a motion to strike
the notice of intent to seek the death penalty and declare the death penalty unconstitutional on the
claim that the deadlock provision was unseverable from the rest of the statute. In rejecting the
claim the judge held that the section was “strongly presumed to be constitutional” and that the
defendant had not made the requisite showing that it was invalid beyond a reasonable doubt.46
Notwithstanding this ruling, the judge instructed the jury that if they deadlocked during the
penalty phase that he would be required to sentence the defendant indeterminately. However, he
further instructed them that in that event, he would impose consecutive sentences on the six
counts of Murder in the First Degree that the defendant had been found guilty of, thereby
imposing a minimum sentence of 175 years.47 In considering this point on appeal, the Court,
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which will have at least two new members, and possibly a third48 could revisit the issue,
particularly in light of the Legislature’s inaction. It could affirm the sentence finding that the
deadlock instruction given in the court below ameliorated the danger highlighted in Lavalle.
Such a finding, although highly unlikely, could open the way to the Court affirming its first death
sentence. More likely, is that the Court will do what it did in Harris. It will invalidate the death
sentence because it was imposed at a time when the instruction was part of the statute and
remand the case for re-sentencing.
The decision in Lavalle, however, raises a more interesting question. Judge R.S. Smith in
his dissent contended that the majority’s decision did nothing more than “...elevate[s] judicial
distaste for the death penalty over the legislative will.”49 Such a claim bears examination. It can
hardly be gainsaid that the detour away from the Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution and the imposition of greater guarantees to those prosecuted capitally in New York
under the State Constitution is a dramatic turn. Critics of the Court’s jurisprudence in this area
could take note of the fact that the Court has been quick to invoke the Supremacy Clause postFurman and Gregg to invalidate the death penalty in New York when the situation was ripe to do
so. It would not be a stretch to make the argument that it quickly seized upon the holding in
Jackson and used it to reach the obverse result that the Supreme Court did, i.e. invalidating the
plea provisions rather than the death penalty itself. Such an application has permitted the Court to
vacate the death sentences under the 1995 legislation without having to take on the more
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controversial task of addressing the constitutionality of the death penalty itself
It thus leaves us with the question, that if the Court of Appeals does indeed have a
judicial distaste for the death penalty, why not hold that the New York State Constitutional
prohibition against the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments50 afford greater protection
than that enshrined in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and ban capital
punishment in New York altogether ?
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